Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions by Ferejohn, John A. et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHOICE 
FUNCTIONS 
John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether, and 
Richard D. McKelvey 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 300 
January 1980
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether, and Richard D. McKelvey 
California Institute of Technology 
January 1980 
Abstract 
A social choice function is said to be implementable if and 
only if there exists a game form such that for all preference profiles 
an equilibrium strategy n-tuple exists and any equilibrium strategy 
n-tuples of the game yield outcomes in the social choice set. A social 
choice function is defined to be minimally democratic if and only if 
whenever there exists an alternative which is ranked first by n-1 
voters and is no lower than second for the last voter, then the social 
choice must be uniquely that alternative. No constraints are placed 
on the social choice function for other preference profiles. 
Using the usual definitions of equilibria for n-person games -­
namely Nash and strong equilibria, it is shown here that over unrestricted 
preference domains, no minimally democratic social choice function is 
implementable. The same result holds in certain restricted domains 
of the type assumed by economists over public goods spaces. We then 
show that a different notion of equilibrium -- namely that of 
sophisticated equilibrium -- allows for implementation of democratic 
social choice functions also having further appealing properties, The 
implication is that models of democratic political processes can not be 
based on the standard equilibrium notions of Nash or strong equilibria. 
IMPLE MENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS* 
John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether, and Richard D. McKelvey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose in this paper is to show that for � democratic 
social choice function and for the kinds of equilibria discussed by 
Maskin and others, mechanisms do not exist which will support 
acceptable" outcomes as equilibria. This result is true even if 
preferences are restricted to allow only preferences of the type 
usually assumed by economists on public goods spaces. We then give 
a concept of equilibrium for which intuitively appealing "implementations" 
of democratic social choice functions do exist. 
In a recent paper, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin [1978) 
show that if the domain of preferences is unrestricted, then no 
single valued nondictatorial social choice function can be implemented. 
More precisely, no mechanism can be constructed which for all 
preference profiles yields the social choice as its unique Nash or 
strong equilibria. This result has not drawn a great deal of attention 
because of its assumption of single valuedness. In fact, more 
recent work has seemed to indicate that even in unrestricted preference 
domains, the impossibility results evaporate if multiple valued 
social choice functions are admitted. For example, Maskin [1977) 
has shown that any monotonic social choice function with no veto players 
* We thank Jeff Richelson for useful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper, and acknowledge the financial support of NSF grant 
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can be implemented, and Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978) have constructed 
a game form which implements a social choice function whose outcomes 
are always Pareto optimal. 
This paper shows that if the social choice function satisfies 
even the weakest conditions of responsiveness to individual preferences 
-- conditions which one would expect any democratic social choice 
function to satisfy -- then the impossibility result returns. The 
implication is that any attempt to implement "reasonable" social 
choice functions must rely on preference restrictions or on different 
equilibrium notions than the Nash and strong equilibria which 
are usually assumed. 
For economic environments, mechanisms have been constructed 
which "support" as their Nash equilibria, allocations in the 
Core (Wilson [1978) ), and the Walrasian allocations (Schmeidler [1976)). 
Of course, the principal reason that attractive implementations 
sometimes are available for social choice functions restricted to economic 
environments is that the collection of preference configurations 
on which the implementation must work is a small subset of the 
collection of all n-tuples of weak orders. E ven in these environments, 
Maskin has found that the mechanisms which will implement the collection 
of individually rational Pareto optimal allocations in the sense of 
Nash equilibria requires that each agent have an extremely large 
strategy set. He has therefore moved in the direction of utilizing 
a new equilibrium concept that allows for the implementation by a 
more appealing mechanism. While we show that Maskin' s new equilibrium 
concept does not allow the implementation of democratic social choice 
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functions if the domain of admissible preference configuration is 
unrestricted, it might allow such implementations in certain restricted 
domains. 
Unfortunately if one demands that a democratic social choice 
function at the least be able to apply to the choice among three 
alternatives, no natural restriction on the domain of preference 
configuration seems to be available. Perhaps in some applications 
such restrictions may turn out to be interesting and tractable with 
respect to the implementation of democratic procedures. For now, we 
remain agnostic on that issue and focus instead on introducing an 
alternative concept of equilibrium -- sophisticated equilibrium 
which permits the implementation of a wide class of democratic 
choice rules. 
First we delimit the class of democratic social choice 
functions. Intuitively, we think of democratic social choice functions 
as possessing a certain minimal property. If the configuration of 
preferences in society is such that there exists a particular 
alternative that is ranked first by n-1 individuals, and no lower 
than second by the nth individual, that alternative and only that
alternative, ought to be chosen. In other words, on those rare 
occasions when a single alternative commands a huge majority over 
every other alternative then any democratic voting mechanism should 
choose that distinguished alternative. No further restrictions are 
required for a social choice function to be democratic. 
It should be noted that this property has a long, and we 
think, honorable history in the literature on balloting systems. 
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Indeed, it is a generalization of a property proposed by Condorcet, 
and is widely held to be a desirable characteristic of a voting 
rule. Indeed, the failure of such rul�s as the Borda rule and other 
scoring or "positionalist" rules to satisy the ordinary Condorcet 
property is usually taken to be a strong criticism of the use of 
these rules. It should be noted, however, that the Borda rule as 
well as the other scoring rules, do satisfy our weakened condition 
stated above. We should also point out that our generalized Condorcet 
axiom has the effect of ruling out the possibility that there are 
oligarchies of individuals each of whom possesses the ability to 
veto the choice of some alternatives. This entailment seems quite 
unobjectionable except, possibly, in the single case of the unanimity 
principle. Indeed, the unanimity social choice function is the only 
one that is arguably democratic and which is implementable in the 
sense that a mechanism exists for which the outcome supported by 
Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. 
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
We let N stand for the set of individuals and X, the
collection of potentially available alternatives. Subsets, C, of 
N are sometimes called coalitions. E ach individual i EN has a 
complete, reflexive, transitive preference relation (or weak 
ordering) on X denoted by Ri. As usual, we let Pi and Ii represent
the assymmetric and symmetric parts of Ri. The collection of all 
weak orders on X is denoted R.
A social choice function (SCF) is a correspondence F which 
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maps �lements of Rn into subsets of X. For each ! £ Rn the subset 
F(!) � X is thought of here, as the set of acceptable alternatives 
associated with the configuration!= (� ,R2, • . .  ,Rn ). The collection 
of subsets of a set A is written as 2
A. 
A collection of sets Si' i = 1, • . .  ,n together with a function 
G which maps the elements of 
n 
n 
II 
i=l 
S. into X is called a mechanism. 
1 
We write S = IT Si' and will denote these mechanisms by the pair i=l 
�. G> = r. E lements of � are written in the form.!!_= (s1, • • •  ,sn )' and 
* . C N-C for any .!!_, .!!_ £ �. and C � N, we write (.!!_ ,.!!_* ) for the n-tuple 
s' £ S such that si si if i £ C and si = s! if i £ N-C. If 
C N-C N-{i } C = {i } for some i £ N, we write (.!!_ ,.!!_* ) = (.!!_i' .!!.* ).
Given a mechanism r and a preference configuration ! £  Rn, 
a k-equilibrium for <I',� is an element.!!_* £ � such that for all 
coalitions, Cc N such that lcl .2_ k, and for all.!!_£ �' G(.!!_* )Ri 
· C ;tiN-C 
G(.!!_ ,.!!_ ) for some i £ C. E vidently, the Nash equilibria are the 
1-equilibria and the strong equilibria are the n-equilibria. The 
collection of k-equilibria associated with <f,! > is conveniently 
written as E�(�) . 
A social choice function is said to be k-implementable 
if there is a mechanism, r, such that for all R £ Rn 
In other words, a SCF is implementable if a mechanism can be found, 
each of whose k-equilibrium supported outcomes are acceptable for 
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every preference configuration. 
Finally, we present a formal statement of the requirement 
that a SCF be democratic. For any C � N, lcl denotes the number of 
elements in C. For any S � X, µ(S ) denotes the measure of the set 
S. If X is finite, µ(S ) is simply the number of elements of S. If 
Xis a subset of Rn, then µ(S ) is simply the Lesbeque measure of S. 
Now, for any x £ X, and i £ N, define Ri(x ) = {yEX-{x} l yRix},
and Bi(X) {x £ XI Ri(x ) �}. Then set Di(x ) = Ri(x ) - Bi(X). 
So Di(x ) is the set of elements, other than x itself and the maximal 
element, which are as good as x. Now we make several definitions: 
Definition: An alternative x £ X is a consensus alternative if 
Ri
(x ) =�for all i £ N. It is a near consensus alternative if 
3 C � N with lcl _::: n - 1 such that Ri(x ) =�for all i £ C. The
alternative x £ Xis said to be 2+£ bounded if µ(Di(,
x ) ) �£ for
all i £ N. It is 2 bounded if it is 2+0 bounded. Finally, 
x £ Xis a Condorcet alternative iff l {i £ N l xPiy } I >I for all
y £ X -{x}, 
Definition: A social choice function F : Rn + 2X is mininially efficient 
(ME) iff whenever x £ X is a consensus alternative, F(!) = {x}. 
F is minimally democratic ( MD ) iff, whenever x £ X is a near consensus 
alternative and is 2 bounded, then F(�) = {x}. F is £-minimally 
democratic (EMD) iff whenever x £ X is a near consensus alternative 
and is 2+£ bounded then F(!) = {x}. F is a Condorcet extension (CE ) 
iff whenever x £ X is a condorcet alternative, then F(B:) = {x}. 
A few words of interpretation are in order, especially of 
the notion of 2+£ bounded. An alternative is 2 bounded iff it is 
7 
no lower than second in any individuals ranking. An alternative x 
is 2+£ bounded iff the measure of the set of alternatives ranked between 
x and the best alternative is no more than E. This definition is 
needed for continuous alternative spaces with continuous preferences 
where the notion of second best may be undefined. Here, if x is 
2+s bounded, it is at most "s away from second place" for everyone. 
Now a minimally efficient social choice function need only 
choose consensus alternatives uniquely when they exist. I. e. , in the 
infrequent cases when one alternative is ranked best by all voters, 
that must be uniquely chosen. Similarly, for the case of a 
minimally democratic social choice function, the social choice 
function need only choose near consensus alternatives which are 
2-bounded when they exist. In other words, in the cases where one 
alternative is ranked first by n - 1 voters and no lower than second 
by the last voter, that alternative should be uniquely the social 
choice. No restrictions are placed on what the social choice should 
be in other configurations -- in particular it need not be single 
valued elsewhere. 
SCF' s satisfying E MD have a similar interpretation, and 
finally, Condorcet extensions must choose Condorcet points uniquely 
when they exist. Again note that no restrictions are made when 
Condorcet points do not exist. It should be noted that other 
definitions of minimal democracy trivially imply the above conditions. 
For example Richelson's [1978) conditions UMP and VUUMP imply both MD 
and E MD for all E and any generalized Condorcet extension principle 
would also imply the above conditions. In addition, virtually any 
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specific social choice functions that have been studied, with the 
exception of the Pareto optimal set, satisy the conditions MD and 
E MD. 
III. AN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
In this section we establish the following, somewhat 
depressing result: if a SCF satisfies MD, then it is not k-implementable 
for any k. In other words if a SCF is minimally democratic there 
exists no mechanism with the property that all of its k-equilibria are 
acceptable for each R E Rn. To establish this fact we need two
additional definitions and a simple lemma due to Maskin [1977) .  
Definition: For any k E {1,2, . • .  ,n }, R E  Rn, and mechanism r 
Definition: A function H R
n + X is monotone if for any x E X, 
R and R' E Rn such that x EH(�), and xRiy � xRiy Vi EN, 
Vy F x, x EH(!:' ).
Lemma: H
k 
is monotone for each k.
Proof: k Assume x E X and that !:, and!:' are such that x E H � ), 
xRiy =<> xRiy, Vi EN, y'f x. Then there is s E S  such that
s EE�(! ) and x = F(� ). But then s EE�(!' ).
< �,G > 
Q.E.D. 
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Theorem 1: If F is k-implementable for some k E {1,2, • • •  ,k }, and 
IN I .::_ lxl then F is not minimally democratic. 
Proof: Assume F is k-implementable for some k. Then if F is minimally 
democratic, set Ai = {i} for all i 
E N, and set Vi 
= N - Ai for all 
i .::_ i.::. n. Then pick {x1, . . •  ,xn } 5:_ X and construct R E  R
n to satisfy, 
for all 1 < i.::. n, j EN, and y EX - {x1, • • •  ,xn }'
x. 1P.x. (mod n) if j EN - Ai i- J l 
k k Now, since F is k-implementable, x* E H (!) = G 0 E r(!) for some
k-implementation of F, and for some x* E F(!). There are two cases. 
then x* = x2 for some 1 < t < n, and we define !' from ! by moving
xt-l (mod n) up as far as possible in each ordering without changing 
its ordering with respect to xt' Leave all else unchanged. Then
xt-lPjxt for j E Vt' and xt-lPjy for j EN for all other y EX - {x2_1
,xt}.
Hence, by MD, {x2_1} = F(!'). But this contradicts the monotonicity 
k 
of H ,  since ('rJj E N)('rJy EX - {xt })(x2Rjy � x2Rj y) and 
construct !' from B: by moving x1 to the top of every ordering. 
by MD, {x1 } = F(!'), which again contradicts the monotonicity of
Hk. Thus, F cannot be minimally democratic. 
Q.E .D. 
Then 
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The above result assumes an unrestricted domain of 
preferences. It is possible that if the set of possible preferences 
were to be restricted, the previous argument would not work. 
We present here some results addressing this question. The 
preference restrictions considered here are the usual preference 
restrictions assumed by economists over public goods spaces, Namely, 
it is assumed that all preferences are pseudoconcave. So let E 
denote the real numbers and let X !:_ E m be convex, with a nonempty 
interior. Then R c Xx X is said to be pseudoconcave iff it 
is representable by a differentiable function u: E m + E satisfying
'rJx, y EX, 
Vu(x) (y - x) < 0 � u(x) � u(y). ( * )  
(So R is pseudoconcave iff it is quasi concave and has a differentiable 
representation whose gradient is nonzero except possibly at a maximum. ) 
We define 
0 
and we let E_ 
{R !:_Xx XI R is pseudoconcave },
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We first prove a lemma 
Lemma 1 0 If R E R , and if x*, y* E X satisfy y* E Int {y .E xlyRx*}, then
there exists a R' E RO satisfying 
Proof: 
a )  {y E Xlx*Ry } .::_ {y E Xlx*R' y }
b )  yR'x* for no y E X-{x*} 
m + For any x EE , and r E E , let B(x,r ) denote the closed ball
of radius r and center x. Let u : E m+ E be a representation of R 
satisfying ( * ). Now, by assumption, for some E > 0, B(y*,E) � {y E EmlyRix*}. 
Also, by differentiability of u, for some o > O,
take 
( ( Vu(x* ) ) ) { ml B x* + o ljVu(x* )li
, o � y E E  yRix*}, 
D 
( 
(
.Vu. (x* ) 
) 
) 
B(y*,E) U B x* + o llvu!(x* )li ,o 
and set D* to be the convex hull of D. Now for any y E Em, with
y {= y*, define 
then set 
t y sup {zt>O 
ty + (1 - t )y*lz E D*} 
g(y ) 
{ 0 if y y* 
= -lif y {= l 
t2 
y 
Now g :  Em+ E is a differentiable function satisfying (*). So 
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defining R' � X x X by xR' y '*="> g(x ) 2:_ g(y ) for any x, y E X, it 
follows that R' E RO satisfies the conditions of the Lemma. 
Q.E.D. 
We proceed to the theorems, and start with a result which is 
weaker than the results of the previous section, but which holds on 
small dimensional spaces, 
Theorem 2: 0 x If F :  E. + 2 is a Condorcet extension, where X �Em, 
and m2:_ 2, it is not k-implementable. 
Proof: Let r <_£_,G> be a k-implementation of F, and let 
as defined above. Then H
k is monotonic. 
0 Now let B: E R be any
profile for which there is not a Condorcet alternative. That 
such profiles exist is easily seen by the following construction. 
Let ai be the i
th basis vector, and pick x0 E X, t1,t2, E R
such that � = x0 + t1 a1 and x2 = x0 + t2 a2 are both in 
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the interior of X. Then partition N into c0, c1, and c2 
such that
For i E C., let preferences be based on Euclidian 
J. 
distance from x . •  
J 
I.e., 'rlx,y E X, xRiy � !lx- x
.ll<!l y - x.11.J - J 
any alternative x E X is majority beaten by another alternative 
Now 
x* E X  as follows: Set z. = (x. -x) for j = 0,1,2, and pick any twoJ J 
zj,zk which are linearly dependent. Then for small enough E, it follows
that x* = [x + E · (zj + zk)] is majority preferred to x. Further, for
all x E X, by convexity of X, it follows that x* E X. 
So let ! E E_O be any profile for which there is no Condorcet
alternative, and let x E H
k(!). Now, pick x' E X  with l{i E Nlx'Pix}I > I• 
and let C = {i E Nlx'Pix}. Now construct R' E R
O so that 'r/i E N  - C,
Rj_ = Ri' and such that 'r/i E N
(*) 
Further, for all i E c, construct !' such that x'Pj_y for all
YE X - {x'}. By Lemma 1, it follows that it is possible to construct 
Rj
_ 
E RO sati'sfying this condition as well as (*). But, then x' is a
Condorcet point for the profile !'· Hence F(!') = {x'}, since 
F is a Condorcet extension. So Hk(!') = {x'}. But, by (*),
for all i E N  and all y E X, xRiy => xRj_y. Also x E H
k(!).
So by monotonicity, we should have x E Hk(!'), a contradiction,
so the result follows. 
Q.E.D. 
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The next result shows that in large dimensional spaces, 
results akin to those of Theorem 1 hold. In order to prove this 
result, however, it is necessary to make assumptions about X, 
guaranteeing the smoothness of the boundary of X, if it exists. 
Specifically, X is said to be � if for all x E X, 3 z E E'm
with z F 0 such that for all y E Em with y • z > 0, 3 E > 0 such that
x + E y EX. This leads to the following theorem. 
Theorem 3: Let F : RO + 2X be a SCF, where X 2: E
m, m � n, and
X is smooth, then for any E > O, if F is E-Minimally Democratic, 
it is not k-implementable. 
Proof: As in the previous proof, let r = < �,G> be a k-implementation 
k and define H (!) as before. Now let a. be the ith standard basis1 
vector in Em, and for all i E N, define Ri as follows: 'rf x,y E X
Now since Hk(!) F �.pick x E Hk(!). Now pick z E Em such that if x
is a boundary point of X, then z is the direction vector of the supporting 
hyperplane. If x is not a boundary point then z can be chosen 
arbitrarily, as long as z F O. It follows that x + E z E X for
some E > O. Now pick w E Em to satisfy w • z > 0 and such that
w • a. > 0 for at least n - 1 j E N. To see that this is possible,J 
write z 
m 
l a
i 
ai, and wi=l 
m 
l bia.. Then we havei=l 1 
m 
w • z > 0 � . l aibi > 0 i=l 
w •
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(*) 
Now, since z f 0, it follows that ai f 0 for at least one i. Then
for all j f 1, we let b. = 1. For j i, pick b. to satisfy (*). 
J J 
Of course we may have either j E N or j t N. Now by the assumption 
that X has a smooth boundary, it follows that for some E, x + E • w E X. 
Set x' = x + E • w. It follows that for all i EC= N-{j}, that 
x'Pix' Now, as in the proof of Theorem 2, using Lemma 1, we can
construct R' E RO so that Vi E C, {y E xlxRiy} .::_ {y E xlxRf.y}, and such
that x'Piy for all y E X. For i E N - C, (if N - C f �) construct
Ri so that xPiy for all y EX and so that µ(Ri (x')) .:::_ E. It follows
that for all y E X and all i 8 N, that xRiy � xRiY· Hence, by
monotonicity of H
k
, we must have x E Hk(!'). But by construction,
x' is a near consensus alternative and is 2 + E bounded. Hence 
Hk(�') = {x'}, a contradiction. So F cannot be k-implementable.
Q.E.D. 
Finally, we present a result showing that regardless of 
the dimensionality of the alternative space, if X is open, then not 
even minimally efficient social choice functions are implementable. 
It is easy to see that a similar result would hold if X were closed 
but unbounded, This theorem is rather pathological, depending as 
it does on the noncompactness of the alternative space, and it is 
presented only for completeness. It should be noted that the above 
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two theorems hold whether or not X is compact. 
Theorem 4 :  If F : RO + zX is minimally efficient, and X is open,
then it is not k-implementable. 
Proof As in the previous proof let f = �,G> be a k implementation, 
and define Hk�) as before. Now pick any a E Ifl, and for all
i E N, define Ri as follows: V x,y E X
Now since Hk(�) f �. pick x E Hk(!). Then since X is open, we can
find x' EX with x' · a > x •a, i.e., such that x'Pix for all i EN.
Now construct R' E RO so that V i  E N, {y E xlxRf.y} .::_ {y E xlxRf.y} and
further such that x'Piy for all y E X. By Lemma 1, it follows that it
is possible to construct Rf. E RO satisfying these conditions. But
then x' is a consensus alternative, so we must have F�') = {x'}. 
I.e., Hk(�') = {x'}. But by monotonicity of Hk, we must have
x E Hk�'), a contradiction.
IV, AN ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRIUM NOTION 
Q.E.D. 
The results of the previous section are counterintuitive. 
They tell us that no democratic system can be implemented; but 
we observe pervasive attempts in the real world to do exactly 
that -- namely to set up institutions which allegedly have at 
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least minimally democratic properties. Are such institutions 
doomed to failure, or is there something defective in the concept of 
implementation that we are employi�g here? 
The main factors which seem to be driving the impossibility 
results of the previous section, as well as those of Maskin, are 
the special properties of the equilibrium definitions being used. 
The definition of k-equilibrium allows us to deal simultaneously 
with Nash equilibria and strong equilibria. However both of these 
notions of equilibria have well known disadvantages. Nash 
equilibria generally tend to exist, but to be nonunique. A common 
problem with Nash equilibria in voting games is that there are frequently, 
in addition to the "reasonable," or "natural" Nash equilibria, a 
plethora of so called "bogus" equilibria, in which strategy n-tuples 
which are patently absurd for each individual player are nevertheless 
Nash equilibria, because no one player has the power to unilaterally 
change the outcome by a change in his own strategy. The definition 
of implementation used here, and elsewhere in the literature, 
requires all such bogus equilibria to support outcomes chosen 
by the social choice function. Of course, strong equilibria 
avoid this problem, because coalitions of players can get together 
and eliminate such strategies. However strong equilibria 
have the problem that there are generally too few of them. It is 
difficult to construct games where such equilibria exist for any 
large domain of preference profiles. Thus, by using the notion 
of k-equilibria, we are stuck on the horns of a dilemma. On the one 
hand if k is small, (so we are close to Nash equilibria), any game 
we design will generally have too many equilibria, and hence will 
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fail to implement our social choice function because it will 
sometimes produce bogus equilibria yielding outcomes outside of the 
SCF. On the other hand, if k is large (s� we are close to strong 
equilibria), any game we design will generally have no equilibria 
for some profile. 
In this section, we investigate an alternative equilibrium 
notion, which has the effect of eliminating bogus equilibria without 
running into existence problems. In particular, we look at 
"sophisticated" equilibria. This approach is not at all new to this 
paper, and has received considerable attention in both the game 
theoretic literature and literature on voting theory. In fact, in a 
recent article, Moulin [1979] proposes exactly the same solution 
notion as a means of implementing efficient social choice functions 
which are anonymous or neutral. In the voting theory literature, 
sophisticated voting was defined by Farquharson [196 9], and has 
been studied by numerous authors, including Miller [1978] and Kramer 
[1972]. For games arising from binary voting procedures, McKelvey 
and Niemi [1978] and Gretlein [1979] show that there are close 
connections between sophisticated equilibria and multistate equilibria, 
which have been studied by Shapley [1953], and others. In the game 
theoretic literature, ideas similar to those underlying sophisticated 
voting have been developed by Selten [1975] under the name "perfect 
equilibrium." 
As in the previous section, let r = <�,G> be a mechanism, 
and let R E  Rn. Then for any i EN, and for any s, s' E Si' we
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say that s dominates s' if 
(a) 'r/!!._,!!._' E S with s. s,si 1 
N-{i}
s' and s 
(b) 3!!._,!!._' E S with s. s,si_ 1 d N-{i} ,N-{i} h thats an .£. = .£_ sue 1 
G(�)PiG(�').
A strategy s E Si is said 
to be primarily admissible for i in
<I',B:_> if it is not dominated by any other strategy in Si. 
For each
i E N, we let sil) be the set of primarily admissible strategies, 
artd let �
(l) 
= IT Si 
(l), and I'
(l) 
= <�(l
) ,G(l)>, where G
(l) is G
iEN 
restricted to s(l). Then, for any m > 1, and i E N, we define 
s(m) to be the set of strategies which are primarily admissible fori 
i in <r(m-l),B:_>. We set �(m)
where G(m) is G restricted to S
(m). The sets 
m-arily admissible strategies for i, and r
(m)
reduction of I'. Finally, we set S� 
S(�
) are called the
1 
this called the �-
IT S (u), and
iEN 
r(u
) 
= <�(u) ,G
<u» where G
u is G restricted to �
u. Then S� is called
the set of ultimately admissible or sophisticated strategies for i,
and ru is called the ultimate, or final reduction of r. For any
r = <�,G> and R E Rn, we write
to represent the set of n-tuples of sophisticated strategies. 
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Now, the social choice function F: Rn+ X is said to
be implementable in sophisticated strategies if there is a mechanism, 
r = <�,G> such that for all R E  Rn,
A few words of interpretation are in order. The sophisticated 
strategies in the mechanism r are simply the strategies which remain 
after successive reductions of the original mechanism, where, at each 
stage of the reduction each player simply eliminates presently dominated 
strategies. It is easily shown that if I E�(B:)i = 1, then the sophisticated
strategy n-tuple is also a Nash equilibrium. In general, however 
there may remain strategy n-tuples .£_ E E�(B:) which are not Nash
Equilibria. Note in fact that E�(B:) f �. since S� must always
contain at least one strategy for all i E N and m > 0. 
We now give two examples showing how sophisticated equilibria 
can be used to implement democratic social choice functions. The 
first example is a special case of the procedures considered by 
Farquharson [1969], namely fixed agendas using binary voting 
processes. The second example requires preference restrictions as 
well as the notion of sophisticated equilibria. 
Example 1: Fixed Agenda, Binary Procedure 
In a recent article, Moulin [1979] has shown that using 
sophisticated equilibria, the ammendment procedure implements a 
Pareto efficient, anonymous social choice function. Here, drawing 
on results from McKelvey and Niemi [1978] and Gretlein [1979], we 
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show further that that procedure, as well as any sequential voting 
process based on binary procedures and a fixed agenda is a 
Condorcet extension. We first need a series of definitions in 
order to define binary voting procedures based on fixed agendas, 
A voting tree over Xis a pair IT = (A,�) where A =  (A,P) is 
a finite topolosical tree*, and � : A'+ X is a function which associates
with each terminal node r in A, an alternative �(r) E A. The voting tree 
is binary if, for each nonterminal node, r E A, there are associated 
exactly two following nodes. In a binary voting tree, at any given 
node, the following branches can be indexed by 0 or 1. We can identify 
a node of IT in terms of the history of branches that are taken to get to 
it (starting from the origin) thus a node is identified by a p-tuple 
r = (r1, . .. ,rp), where r1 is the first branch that is taken, r2 
the second, etc. (note that p is the number of branches that must 
be tranversed to get to node r). For binary procedures it follows 
that for any r E A, r E {O,l }P for some p ..'.: O. (Note that for the
origin, r = �. and p = 0). We let A'� A denote the nonterminal 
nodes of IT and A' c A be the terminal nodes. Further, we set K = IA' I, 
and let$: A'+ {1,2, • . •  , } be any one to one enumeration of these 
nodes. We use the notation rj = $-l (J) to denote the j th node of 
this enumeration. 
Now for any vector d 
follows: Set 
* 
r* 
1 
See McKelvey and Niemi, p. 9 for a formal definition. 
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and for j > 1, 
r* j d�( * * ) as long as (r1
*, . . .  ,r
J
�-l) E A' .'+' rl' • . •  ,rj-1
' 
Then set 
* where rd is the terminal node in the above process. 
Next, let v : {O,l }n + {O,l } be the binary majority rule
function, i. e. , for any s = (s1, . • •  ,sn) E {O,l }
n 
{
1
0 
if l Si > % 
v(s) 
if otherwise 
and define V : ({O,l}K)
n 
as follows: For any� = (s1, • . •  ,sn
) E ({O,l }K)
n, 
k and all 0 � k.� K set s = (s1k,s2k' '"' snk)' and then 
V(s) 1 2 K (v(s ),v(s .), . . .  ,v(s )) 
Then the pair (IT,V) is called a binary voting procedure based on 
majority rule. 
Now we define a mechanism, r = �, G> on the basis of the above 
definition. For each i E N, set Si 
is defined by, for any � E �' 
{O,l }K, Now G : S = IT S + X 
iEN i 
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It now follows from theorem 1 and corollary 1 of McKelvey and Niemi 
[1978) together with theorem 2 of Gretlein [1979) that G(E�(�)) is
single valued for all R E  R
n, and that it is also a Condorcet
extension. Hence 
is a social choice function, which, by construction, is implementable 
in sophisticated strategies by r. 
Example 2: Two Candidate Competition 
In this example, a type of implementation is arrived 
at by introducing two political entrepeneurs (candidates) who's 
sole function is to adopt policy positions in an attempt to win 
an election. Their preferences are thus restricted, and in the 
resulting game they try and provide the voters with "socially 
desirable" outcomes. The mechanism is constructed so that it is 
a dominant strategy for voters to provide correct information 
about their preferences. From the point of view of the voters, 
the resulting mechanism implements a Condorcet extension which is 
neutral, anonymous, and Pareto efficient. 
We set 
N' {1,2,. • •  ,n } U {n+l,n+2}  N U J 
x' J x x. 
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We can think, then of N as the set of voters, and J as the set of 
candidates. The set X' is the set of final outcomes, which consist of
a policy x E X, together with a candidate j E J to carry out the
policy. Then define 
X x X + J for i E N 
x for i E J 
So candidates choose policy positions, while voters choose candidates, 
based on their policy positions. Set 
For any � 
define 
j*(�) 
and set 
x* (E_) 
IT S
i, S
J= ITS., S 
iEN iEJ 1 
N J (s ,s ) 
smallest j* E J such that 
Hj* (�). 
max 
jEJ 
Thus, j*(E_) is the candidate with the largest number of votes, 
with ties broken arbitrarily (i. e. , the first candidate wins 
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in a case of a tie), and x*(�) is the policy adopted by the winning 
candidate, Then set 
G (�) = (j * (�) , x* ( s)) 
Now it is assumed that for each i E N, there is a weak 
order Ri on X, representing i's preferences over the basic alternatives,
and a weak order R. on J representing i's preferences over the
1 
candidates. It is assumed that for j,k E J, if j � k, then jP.k.J 
These preferences are extended to preferences Ri over X' as follows:
For any (j,x),(k,y) E X', 
a) If i E N, (j ,x)Rf (k,y) «> xRiy
A 
b) If i E J, (j ,x)Rf (k,y) «> jRik
Thus, voters care only about what policy is adopted, 
having no preference for which candidate is elected, and candidates 
care only about being elected, having no policy preferences.* 
We now consider properties of G(E�
.
(Bc')), We are concerned 
only with the voters i E N, and so since voters have no preferences 
over which candidate is elected, we can equivalently look at 
x*(E�(Bc')), and look at this as a function of the preferences
R = (R1, • . .  ,Rn) of voters in N. 
Thus let
F(Bc) 
* 
The same results follow if the following 
made about preferences 
a) If i E N, (j ,x)Ri (k,y) � x�iy or
b) If i E J, (j ,x)R:f. (k,y) � jPik or
lexicographic assumption is 
A 
(xI .y and jR
1
.k),,1 
(ji
ik and xRiy)
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Under the above assumptions, it follows that for i E N, si
is an admissible strategy iff Vsi E Si and Vs
J E SJ,
In other words, 
s (sJ)R.s t (aJ)s. 1 s. v 
1 1 
setting J {j ,k}' s. 1 
is 
J Vs = (sj'sk) 
E SJ
{: if s/iskJ si(s ) if skPisj
admissible iff 
note that si(s
J) is unrestricted if sjiisk. However, in general,
�strategy is primarily admissible for i E J, Thus, after the 
first reduction, we have, for all s E §_(l),
x*(�) 
It follows, that if there is a Condorcet point, x* E X, then for 
all y E X 
> .!!. 2 
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(1) 
Now, for j £ J, sj = x* dominates any other strategy x £ Sj , because, 
picking k £ J -{j }, for any !i•!i* £ S(l) with sj x,s/ x*, and 
N' -{j } *N' -{j } s = s ' 
j*(s*) 
j* (Ii_) 
r j or 
f or k 
if sk f. x* 
k if sk = x
* 
k if sk f. x* 
if sk x* 
Hence, it follows that if there is a Condorcet point x*, then the second 
reduction has s(2) satisfying 
For i £ N, si2) is the set of strategies satisfying (*) 
For i £ J, s�2) 
l. 
{x*}. 
It follows, for all !i £ s(2), that G(fi) = (j,x*) for some j £ J.
Note that the second reduction is also the final reduction. Thus, 
any sophisticated strategy in this mechanism picks out a Condorcet 
point if there is one. 
Further, it follows from results of McKelvey and Ordeshook 
[1976 ) ,  that regardless of whether or not there is a Condorcet 
point, that for all !i £ �(2), and hence for all !i £ �u, that
x*(!i_) is pareto optimal. Finally, it is easily shown that 
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F(�) = x*(E�(�')) is neutral and anonymous. This example shows 
then, how a combination of preference restrictions and a revised 
equilibrium concept can lead to implementability of a democratic 
social choice function. 
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